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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades telecommunications industry (as well as other net-
work industries such as electricity and railway) has been reshaped by 
new regulatory policies and regimes that foster competition by splitting 
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functionally-integrated monopolistic operators formerly controlled by 
the state, allowing new private entrants. At the same time, telecommu-
nication industry has been further concerned with high pace of innova-
tion and R&D devoted to introducing new products and services as well as 
experimenting alternative industrial organisation forms. Higher innova-
tion implies stronger presence of intangible resources as critical produc-
tion inputs, involving specific accounting problems from the policy-mak-
ing viewpoint. Among others, Kridel et al. (1996) review effects of incentive 
regulation in the Telecommunication Industry, while Bourreau and Dogan 
(2001) develop an economic analysis of the relationship between regula-
tion and innovation.
In this context, competition-based regulatory policies and regimes are 
expected to enhance customers’ welfare while encouraging private financ-
ing of required investments for network development and innovation, 
under overall conditions of efficiency, equity, and access.
Introduction of competition by regulatory design requires reshaping the 
mutual relationship between two main functional operators (Clusters) or 
intermediaries that characterise telecommunications industry: one that 
provides the networking infrastructure; another one providing content 
delivery. The driving idea is then to functionally separate infrastructure 
provision from content provision, which relies on access to that infra-
structure network to make the communication and information contents 
delivered. Therefore, infrastructure provider(s) is (are) obliged by regula-
tion to provide a universal commodity on a competitive market basis to 
(various) content provider(s) operating through infrastructure network(s).
Competition-based regulatory approach is based on conventional wisdom 
that always favours competition for welfare improvement, struggling 
to achieve the same conditions as would have been achieved had condi-
tions of perfect competitive process existed (Fransman, 2008, p. 74 ff.). 
In fact, recent advances in regulation economics and policy cast doubts 
on this wisdom (Robertson and Langlois 1995), suggesting that perfor-
mance-based regulatory frameworks should disentangle incentives to 
develop and deliver high-quality outcome at fair prices for final costum-
ers over time, from rent extraction that eventually leads to misallocation 
of resources and detrimental effects on welfare (Laffont and Tirole, 2000, 
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chapter 2, p. 37 ff.). As a matter of fact, regulatory authorities appear to 
be practically involved in such an effort to balance competitive separa-
tion and cooperative integration in regulated industries submitted to the 
introduction of competition. In particular, European Union is currently 
reviewing a new regulatory framework for information and communi-
cation networks and services that aims to regulate access to, and pro-
mote investment and innovation in them (Huigen and Cave, 2008). Under 
European Community Treaty (articles 170 ff.), telecommunications provi-
sion includes a mission of “general economic interest” for these “essential 
facilities” and must comply with competitive settings as well as with pub-
lic interest objectives of national and trans-national integration and uni-
versal accessibility. Balance and reconciliation between these distinctive 
policy purposes constitutes the current agenda of national and European 
regulatory agencies. Since 2005, UK has adopted a regulatory scheme 
based on “functional separation”, which specifies terms and conditions 
on which access to infrastructure network(s) is granted to other operators 
by incumbent former monopolist. Other countries, such as Italy, Sweden, 
Australia and New Zealand, have been preparing functional separation 
regulatory schemes to be applied to their telecommunications industry. 
French Telecommunications Authority is also fostering a compulsory sys-
tem of rules concerned with access, costing and pricing in order to assure 
a fair competitive process (ARCEP 2007).
Generally speaking, purpose and scope of telecommunications industry is 
to connect producers of contents (who originate information and commu-
nication) to final consumers (who receive them), trough the interaction of 
two main intermediaries: operators of communication infrastructures; and 
providers of information services over these infrastructures. By adopting 
this comprehensive perspective, our paper aims to analyse telecommuni-
cations industry through its functional system of industrial relationships 
which produces a joint outcome. On this basis, we develop a comparative 
institutional economic analysis over two steps. The first step consists in 
developing heuristic institutional economic models of regulatory schemes 
of functional separation and integration. The second step consists in com-
parative impact assessment of both regulatory schemes on levels of (and 
incentives to) innovation and R&D by operators (or intermediaries) submit-
ted to each regulation, and on the overall performance for final users (i.e., 
producers and consumers of information and communication contents). 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First section subsumes some 
featuring characteristics of telecommunications industry into a func-
tional system of industrial relationships. Second section provides heuristic 
models of this system under alternative regulatory schemes of functional 
separation and integration; accordingly, telecommunications industry is 
jointly constituted by three functional Clusters (intermediaries) which 
exploit four kinds of tangible and intangible resources related to innova-
tion and R&D. Third section derives implications and recommendations 
from comparative assessment of these models for industrial and account-
ing regulations concerned with telecommunications industry.
1. UNDERSTANDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY THROUGH ITS FUNCTIONAL 
SYSTEM OF RELATIONSHIPS
1.1. Beyond a market-based perspective:  
featuring facts about telecommunications industry
First of all, telecommunications industry is factually populated by rela-
tively few, large, innovating operators which, drawing upon a core of key 
competencies and resources, generate a combination of products, services 
and infrastructures. Competitive process is then animated by a “small 
number” of firms (“small number competition” à la Williamson) which 
develop mutual relationships of competition and cooperation (“coope-
tition” according to Moore, 1996; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997). 
Moreover, that combination of telecommunication products, services and 
infrastructures implies delivering a combined “telecommunication out-
come” that enables connection between producers (who originate infor-
mation and communication contents) and final consumers (who receive 
those contents). Both producers and consumers (respectively emitters and 
receivers of information and communication) are not so much interested 
in various products, services and infrastructures separately, but in the 
overall performance of the joint outcome of these elements. Finally, deliv-
ery of this joint outcome appears to be functionally organised by lead-
ing intermediaries, which prescribe the economic and social conditions of 
production and combination of telecommunication products, services and 
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infrastructures (Benghozi and Paris, 2007).1 In this relational economic 
environment, key institutional structures, including accounting systems, 
frame and shape the ongoing productive process of creation and allocation 
of resources within and between firms (Biondi et al., 2007). In particular, 
accounting structures define a conventional representation of costing and 
pricing that is adopted for contractual and regulatory purposes. At the 
same time, alternative accounting systems imply different modes of calcu-
lation for investment costs, operational costs and related remunerations 
of inputs and outputs within the industry, trough time, space and inter-
action. These accounting systems settle who pays what and under which 
terms and conditions among various stakeholders of telecommunications 
system.
These featuring facts about telecommunications industry cast doubts on 
conventional wisdom that understands this industry through the lens of 
a “fair competitive process”. A market-based view (which generally under-
pins competition-based regulation) struggles to subsume and regulate the 
whole industry as if it comprises only arm’s length transactions between 
independent parties. However, mimicking market conditions may be mis-
leading and eventually undermine required achievement of efficiency, 
equity, and access for provision of these “essential facilities”. This view 
understands an industrial system by looking at marketable rights on 
products and resources which are supposed to pre-exist and may then be 
properly priced on various telecommunications “market(s)”. This view 
leads to split various functional activities in distinctive markets of ref-
erence for regulatory purposes. This approach does not properly capture 
actual conditions that make telecommunications possible though mutual 
interactions between various operators and intermediaries over techni-
cal infrastructure network(s) through time and space, in a highly regu-
lated environment through contractual and institutional arrangements. A 
market-based view that is merely established in terms of distinct market 
prices, products, and (sub-)markets misunderstands this industrial real-
ity. For instance2, Bourreau and Dogan (2001) stress the critical role of reg-
ulatory arrangements, arguing that “the present market structure of the 
1 This dual structure of prescribing intermediation is partly captured by dual auc-
tion modelling. This structure makes critical the regulation of control and access for 
infrastructure and content providers.
2 See also Kiessling and Blondeel (1999).
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telecommunications industry urges some type of control, either by means 
of sector-specific regulation or by competition policy. Asymmetric ex ante 
regulation aims at preventing the incumbent from abusing its dominant 
position, held by virtue of its control of the essential facility, the (ubiq-
uitous) local access networks. […] Therefore, asymmetric regulation also 
serves as a commitment device to attract entry which might not take place 
otherwise. […] Contrary to regulatory policies, competition policies pro-
vide ex post control. However, employment of ex ante regulatory measures 
does not rule out the scope for ex post competition policies. Generally, both 
measures operate jointly in the telecommunications industry.”
Bourreau and Dogan (2001) refer here to widespread industrial regulatory 
frameworks that are better understood as purporting conditional depar-
tures from the general principle of market competition, in order to achieve 
welfare-enhancing industrial performances through different means. For 
instance, following Arrow (1959), allowance of patents and other intel-
lectual property rights repeals from maintaining effective competition, 
for a limited period of time and under specific terms and conditions, in 
order to efficiently remunerate specific investments that develop welfare-
improving R&D activities and resources. In the same spirit, accounting-
based regulatory control of excessive rentability and price-making frames 
and shapes the competitive pricing in order to assure the proper function-
ing of the industrial system for public interest purposes. Moreover, regu-
latory control of costing implies to envelop the industrial structure of pro-
duction through standardised accounting structures (ARCEP 2008) that 
replace competitive costing and pricing. 
1.2. Telecommunications industry as functional 
system of relationships
Drawing upon this featuring departure from a market basis of refer-
ence and analysis, our approach aims to develop an input-output eco-
nomic model that describes the whole telecommunications industry 
as a functional system of industrial relationships. Fransman (2008) 
calls it an “Information and Communication Technologies ecosystem”, 
while Malerba (2004) calls it a telecommunications “system of innova-
tion”. This system performs a joint process of production that delivers a 
joint “telecommunication outcome”. This production process starts from 
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resources development, passes through costing and pricing of related 
functions and products, and is eventually achieved by remuneration 
of these products by sales to final users. This joint process of produc-
tion is performed by distinctive functional operators or intermediar-
ies (Clusters) whose joint outcome is delivered to final users (producers 
and consumers of content). As Holmstrom (1999) does with the econom-
ics of the business firm, our approach understands the whole telecom-
munication system as a “sub-economy”, departing from and expanding 
upon a market-based approach. Following Koopmans (1975), this model 
is also “pre-institutional”, that is, it looks behind the legal form (either 
contractual or institutional) to focalise on functional economic working 
that comprises technical and socio-economic aspects of telecommunica-
tions production. The whole system is then supposed to deliver a bundle 
of infrastructures and services (the telecommunication outcome) that 
allows producers and consumers of information and communication 
(the contents) to be connected to each other. Only the joint productive 
performance of this system of relationships may deliver this telecom-
munications outcome to final users. Our first analytical step consists 
in describing this outcome as a bundle of products, services and infra-
structures that is jointly produced by four functional Clusters (content 
production; content provision; infrastructure provision; innovation and 
development), which, in turn, deploy four kinds of tangible and intan-
gible resources. 
1.3. The telecommunications system:  
the functional Clusters
Four functional Clusters describe here four key economic functions per-
formed by operators and intermediaries in the telecommunications pro-
cess of production: content production (A); content provision (C); infra-
structure provision (S), and research and development (R). Table I resumes 
distinctive characteristics of each Cluster (we refer to the industrial eco-
nomic notion of “Cluster” to stress its functional dimension; a Cluster func-
tion may be performed by a whole of business entities, typically combined 
in one or several enterprise groups or networks. It may further include 
non-business organisations and institutions).
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Creation of Innovation 
and Development
R&D institutions and department, R&D 
joint ventures and partnerships
Cluster S
Provision of networking infra-
structures (technical delivery; 
technological support; telecom-
munications hardware)
Telecommunications firms  
(FT, Bouygues Telecom, and so on)
Cluster C
Provision of Contents (Costumer 
interface over the telecommuni-
cation network; telecommunica-
tions software)
Internet operators (YouTube, Google, 
Facebook), cable- and pay-televi-
sions (Canal+), information agencies 
(Reuters), telephone operators (Skype)
Cluster A Production of content
Movie producers, football representa-
tive agencies, contents self-generated 
by costumers, contents produced by 
content providers
In particular, Cluster A denotes generation of contents originated by cus-
tomers, by independent producers and by the content intermediary C. 
Cluster C assures interface between final users and telecommunication 
facilities; in particular, C performs content provision that denotes infor-
mation and communication delivery through telecommunication infra-
structures; this functional activity is typically accomplished by informa-
tion agencies (Reuters), cable- and internet-televisions (Canal+), internet 
services and platforms (Google, Youtube, Facebook), and so forth. Cluster C 
treats various resources such as: users’ contents; innovation and R&D 
from the creative Cluster R; and infrastructure facilities and services 
from the infrastructure provider S. Cluster S provides telecommunication 
facilities in all their aspects; in particular, Cluster S provides technical 
installation to costumers, and interacts with Cluster C to respond to spe-
cific and changing needs of content provision. S denotes then develop-
ment and deployment of infrastructure facilities; this functional activity 
is typically accomplished by telecommunications firms (France Telecom, 
Bouygues Telecom, and so forth). It treats resources such as R&D and inno-
vation from the creative Cluster R, technical installation to the costum-
ers, and specific devices and solutions for the Cluster C. Last but not least, 
Cluster R captures a specific activity of innovation, research and develop-
ment (R&D) that characterises the so-called “new economy” of informa-
tion and communication. This Cluster constitutes an autonomous function 
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of telecommunication industry, assuring creative continuity and progress 
of the whole system through time and interaction. Therefore, its specific 
output is common to (and shared by) Clusters S and C, and replicates itself 
through time. It is generally accomplished by R&D institutions and depart-
ments, but also by the community at large (for example, through creative 
commons and so forth).
1.4. The telecommunications system:  
a taxonomy of resources
Every Cluster deploys a set of resources that our model classifies according 
to empirically-based accounting methods of recognition and measurement 
(cf. Biondi and Reberioux, 2012 for further details), labelled as tangible, 
“hard” intangible, “soft” intangible and “ethereal” intangible resources.
Tangible resources are material resources that come from outside the tel-
ecommunications system. Together with land and buildings, motor vehi-
cles, furniture, office equipment, computers, fixtures and fittings, plant 
and machinery, this class includes personnel and its imputed monetary 
cost for sake of simplicity.
Hard intangible resources are intangibles that are definitively identifi-
able through a legal or material support making them marketable; they 
have then a market price of reference, making them easier to be repre-
sented. Typical hard intangibles are contents originated by Cluster A, and 
technical installation provided by S directly to final customers.
Soft intangible resources are intangibles that lack in legal or material sup-
port; this means that they do not have a market price of reference, and may 
be identified and represented only through their imputed costs; therefore, 
their actual contribution to the output of each Cluster is not fully covered 
by this measurement. Output provided by Cluster S to Cluster C is typically 
characterised by presence of soft intangible resources.
Ethereal intangible resources are creative commons, ideas and capabilities 
that replicate themselves through time, assuring continued renewal and 
development of the whole system of telecommunications. This Cluster draws 
upon tangible resources, but its contribution cannot be assessed either by 
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market prices imputed costs, because of its continuative and collective deploy-
ment over time; its activity may be associated with tacit knowledge, inven-
tion processes and creativity in technological and socio-economic organisa-
tion of telecommunication industry. This provision of ethereal intangibles 
is increasingly assured by specific R&D departments of, and joint ventures 
between private and public telecommunication intermediaries.
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Table II summarises our fundamental assumptions underlying this clas-
sification of resources deployed by various functional Clusters in the 
economy of telecommunication industry. Both tangible and intangible 
resources enter the production function of each Cluster. Tangible resources 
are exhaustible and imply exclusive exploitation: they respond then to 
decreasing returns to scale. In contrast, soft intangible resources generally 
are “public goods”, that is, they are inexhaustible and not-exclusive: they 
respond then to constant returns to scale, and are expected to increase 
the overall performance of the set of tangible resources exploited by each 
Cluster. While resources that generate economic advantages include both 
tangible and intangible resources, recent studies argue that intangibles 
have the greater potential to create firm capabilities which drive eco-
nomic advantages (Carmeli and Tishler, 2004). According to Constantin 
and Lusch (1994), knowledge-based resources are one of the most perfor-
mance-enhancing forms of intangibles that are exploited in conjunction 
with other resources to generate multiplicative effects. 
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Concerning hard intangibles, their legal structure of protection makes 
them similar to tangible resources from the viewpoint of their exploita-
tion and remuneration. Our model treats them as quasi-tangible resources, 
measured by their market price of reference. Ethereal intangibles are col-
lectively and continuatively generated by the whole system through time; 
therefore, they do not correspond with any identifiable price or imputed 
monetary cost of the period. They may be represented only by a non-mon-
etary system of measurements (Benston et al., 2003, reviewed by Biondi, 
2007), making them not computable from a contractual or regulatory view-
point. This means that, though fundamental, their contribution to the 
overall performance remains interstitial and cannot be included in cost-
ing and pricing of related resources and activities. Biondi and Reberioux 
(2012) address theoretical and practical challenges raised by intangibles, 
providing further analysis and references3.
2. AN INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL 
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
2.1. The productive process of the telecommunication 
industry: intangibles, returns to scale and alternative 
institutional structures of production
Our approach especially captures a featuring aspect of telecommunications 
industry: the whole industry is organised around key functional interme-
diaries (Clusters) that develop and exploit intangible resources related to 
innovation and R&D processes. Since final outcome requires joint use of 
services and infrastructures, innovation processes are expected to require 
some arrangements among those intermediaries to be initiated, developed 
and/or implemented.
From the analytical viewpoint, our model is based upon basic assump-
tions on returns to scale from application of distinctive kinds of 
3 See also Griliches (1998); Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2000); Schreyer (2000), 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), OECD (2001)). Both Eurostat and the OECD have ini-
tiated programs in order to develop new measures for knowledge-based economies, 
improving then on related data collection (i.e. the MERITUM project).
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resources to productive processes at firm and inter-firm levels (Petters 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004). These assumptions are in 
line with classic approaches of industrial economics to innovation and 
R&D (Geroski et al., 1993; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Malerba, 1992). 
However, while other studies point whether innovation and R&D pro-
cesses involve increasing returns to scale at firm, industry or country 
level (Romer, 1986; Jones, 1995; Young, 1998; Arrow, Ng and Yang, 1998), 
our model does not assume but constant returns to scale for intangible 
resources that characterise those processes. Management and industrial 
economic studies show that intangible resources denote organisational 
and cognitive capabilities that are generated by coordination and endur-
ance of industrial activities over time and interaction. Their contribution 
expands upon productivity driven by tangible resources and personnel 
(Griliches, 1994; Villalonga, 2004; Zambon and Marzo, 2007). Accordingly, 
we assume that intangible resources delivered by R&D processes contrib-
ute to the joint production process by multiplying productivity provided 
by tangible resources and personnel.
Instead of focusing only on returns of scale, our approach further points 
to the institutional “structure of production” (à la Coase). Industrial and 
accounting regulatory regimes frame and shape the productive process 
performed by the telecommunication system, influencing its economic 
organisation of production and remuneration. From one hand, account-
ing systems shape representation (recognition and measurement) of tan-
gible and intangible resources (inputs) and their imputation to different 
activities (and outputs) within and between distinctive Clusters (through 
costing). From another hand, industrial regulation frames and shapes the 
functional system of relationships that characterises the telecommunica-
tion industry. In particular, degree of integration (cooperation) and sepa-
ration (competition) are conditional to this regulatory design. Accordingly, 
our model purports to assess economic performance of telecommunica-
tion system under alternative institutional designs of the production pro-
cess. Drawing upon Williamson (1991), we distinguish and prioritize the 
first-order regulatory regime choice from the second order optimal pro-
duction choice. Our model aims to firstly design the production process 
under alternative regulatory regimes (forms of economic organization, in 
Williamson’s terms), and secondly comparatively assess optimal levels of 
R&D and welfare under such “discrete structural analysis” (Williamson, 
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1991, p. 270). Accordingly, our pre-institutional input-output model – com-
prising four functional Clusters (respectively accomplishing R&D; infra-
structure provision; content provision; and content production) which 
exploit four kinds of resources (respectively tangibles, hard intangibles, 
soft intangibles, and ethereal intangibles) – is framed and shaped by two 
paradigmatic regulatory designs: functional integration (Figure 1) and 
functional separation (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. The telecommunications system under functional separation 
In particular, separation case describes an ideal form of regulation that 
establishes a fair competitive process within various “markets” of refer-
ence. This attempt implies to functionally divide the whole industry in 
different products having distinctive market prices, separately delivered 
to customers by a number of intermediaries pertaining to distinctive sub-
sectors or layers which are usually identified according to technologi-
cal or legal-economic characteristics of respective products and services. 
Regulation of competitive pricing in each sub-market of reference is then 
expected to assure suitable conditions of efficiency, equity and access for 
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2.2. Model Outline
Telecommunication outcome Y denotes a bundle of telecommunication 
infrastructures and services jointly provided to final users. Final users 
are interested in the overall performance (utility) of this bundle, although 
they may buy its single components from different operators or interme-
diaries. In particular, the bundle comprises output by content provider C, 
called cY , and output by infrastructure provider S, called sY . Analytically, 
Y y y y y c sC C n S S m Y Y≡ ( ) ≡ ( ), , , ,,... ; ,... ,1 1 . For sake of simplicity, let assume that4 
 Y c s
Y Y
= +  [1]
Final users should afford a vector of monetary payments, called pY, to use 
this bundle. This payment comprises the whole of monetary transfers per-
formed by users and split among different Clusters during a time period 
of reference. From the industry viewpoint, these payments correspond to 
operating revenues collectively collected by (and split among) different 
firms pertaining to respective Clusters.
Figure 3 shows how these two elements of the bundle c s
Y Y
,( ) contribute 
to the final outcome for customers in one illustrative case. In particular, 
higher is this quantity/quality generated by Clusters S and/or C, higher is 
the utility level (which, for sake of simplicity, can be interpreted as the 
sum of the two elements in a single measure of quantity/quality) of the 
final outcome Y.
Four Clusters contribute to produce the joint bundle Y: developer R of 
research and innovation; content provider C; infrastructure provider S; 
and Cluster A which provides contents generated by both final users and 
A itself to Cluster C. Each Cluster exploits and remunerates a definite set 
of resources (inputs) in order to generate another definite set of resources 
(outputs), according to a classic scheme of input-output analysis of produc-
tion. The following paragraphs describe the production functions of these 
Clusters and related inputs and outputs.




are vectors respectively of n and m dimension. Thereafter, we 
omit the vectoral notation for sake of convenience.
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Figure 3. 
Legend: Increasing levels of final outcome Y at various prices py when only the quantity/quality pro-
vided by Cluster C increases from c1 to c2.
2.3. Varieties of resources and their respective 
contribution
As discussed above (Table II), four classes of resources exist: tangibles, 
hard intangibles, soft intangibles, and ethereal intangibles. In particular:
Tangibles resources X
IJ
 with I = R,S,C are material resources acquired from 
outside the Cluster at a cost p
IJ
. By definition, X
IJ
 contributes to pro-
duction under decreasing returns to scale. Analytically, their production 







IJ( )  with a IJ < 1 . To be sure, we label “produc-
tion function” the contribution of input X
IJ
 to production (performed by 
Cluster j) of the respective component of the final bundle Y. 
Hard intangible resources A  are quasi-tangible resources acquired from 
outside the Cluster at a cost p
A
. By definition, A  contributes to produc-
tion under decreasing returns to scale. Analytically, their production 






A( )  with a A < 1 .
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Soft intangible resources r
J
 with J = S, C are immaterial resources gen-
erated by Cluster R whose cost can be measured by imputation of related 
investments. In particular, r
C
 denotes intangible resources that contrib-




 denotes intangible resources processed by 
Cluster S. By definition, both r
J
 contribute to production under constant 
returns to scale. Analytically, their production function is then b
J J




Ethereal intangible resources r
t−1  are immaterial resources inherited 
from past investments in R&D by Cluster R whose cost is not computable. 
By definition, r
t−1  contributes to production under constant returns to 
scale. Analytically, their production function is then b
r t
r −( )1  with br ≥ 1.
As discussed above (Table I), these resources are developed and exploited 
by four functional Clusters: content production (A); content provision (C); 
infrastructure provision (S), and research and development (R). These 
Clusters are embedded in a system of relationships that is shaped by alter-
native regulatory designs. The following section shall describe alternative 
regimes of functional integration and separation, in order to perform a 
comparative institutional economic analysis between them.
2.4. Functional Clusters under integration regime





, through two kinds of input: tangible resources 
( X
RJ
) acquired from outside, and ethereal intangible resources ( r
t−1 ) 
inherited from its past investments in R&D. By definition, research out-
put is indivisible and its use is not-exclusive: our model identifies then 
three distinctive sub-outputs, respectively called rS, rC and rt, generated by 











= ( )−b 1  [3]
with aRJ < 1, b ≥ 1  and J C S= , .
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Although the final intermediate output generated by R&D Cluster may 
be non-separable (entering then the production process as a unique joint 
input), this analytical separation is supposed here to comply with account-





 that are not recognised by accounting systems.
Cluster S generates two sub-outputs: s
Y
, tangible intermediate output that 
enters directly in the bundle Y, and s
R
, a soft intangible intermediate out-
put that is exploited by Cluster C . These outputs are generated through 
three kinds of inputs: tangibles ( X
TS
), soft intangibles ( r
S
) and ethereal 
intangibles ( r
t









 s r r
R S S r t
= + −b b 1  [5]
with aTS < 1  and b bS r, ≥1 .
Cluster C generates output c
Y
 through three kinds of inputs: tangibles 
( X
TC
), ethereal and soft intangible resources received respectively from 




), and hard intangibles received by A . In its 
joint output c
Y
, for sake of analytical clarity and computation, the model 






 generated by the following pro-
duction functions:
 c c c c
Y T A R
















 c r r s
R C C t SR R
= +( ) +b b  [9]
with a a
TC A
, <1  and b b
C SRr
, ≥1 . 
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2.5. Functional Clusters under separation regime
Under separation regime, Clusters S and C are forced to split by regula-
tory design. No alliances, joint ventures or other integrated activities 
are allowed between these main industrial intermediaries that perform 
respectively infrastructure provision and content delivery.
This separation involves disappearance of common Cluster R. However, 
since innovation and development are essential to their respective func-
tional activities, each disintegrated Cluster S, C will respond to this net 
loss by internalizing its specific part of R&D that was formerly developed 
by Cluster R. Each remaining Cluster S, C is then expected to generate by 
itself those ethereal intangible resources that are specific to its functional 
activity. In fact, all research projects that do not directly respond to some 
specific and contingent needs by one of the remaining Clusters are aban-
doned. Furthermore, absence of these projects implies the net loss of all 
benefits derived by sharing expenditures and efforts in innovation and 
R&D over time and interaction. 
Accordingly, our model removes Cluster R in case of separation regime. 
This implies the net loss of all the ethereal intangible resources r
t
 that 
were inherited over time by functional activity performed by R (this activ-
ity being related to continuative and collective expenditures and efforts in 
innovation and R&D). 
Cluster S has now an internal department (or sub-function) that generates 
only those ethereal intangible resources that are specific to its produc-
tion process (replacing those intangibles that were formerly generated by 
Cluster R). These resources rS are generated by the same production func-
tion as before (equation 2). Cluster S generates then two sub-outputs: a tan-
gible sub-output s
Y
 that is directly included in the bundle Y, and a soft 
intangible sub-output s
R
 that is passed-through to Cluster C. These out-
puts are generated by previous production functions (equations 4) and by 
the following function (5’):
 s r
R S S
= b  [5’]
In this latter function, ethereal resources generated by R are set to zero 
(i.e. rt = 0).
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In turn, Cluster C now includes an R&D department (or sub-function) 
that generates those ethereal intangible resources that are specific to 
its activity (replacing those intangibles that were formerly generated by 
Cluster R). These resources rC are generated by the previous production 
function (equation 2). As before, Cluster C generates the joint output c
Y
 – 






– by previous production func-
tions (equations 6, 7 and 8) and by the following function (9’):
 c r s
R C C SR R
= ( ) +b b  [9’]
In this latter function, ethereal resources generated by R are set to zero 
(i.e. rt = 0).
Under separation, it is important to note that s
R
 is acquired by Cluster S 
at a negotiated transfer price pS . This transaction results from separation 
of C and S that are now forced to internalise their respective functional 
activities of innovation and R&D previously accomplished by an autono-
mous Cluster R. Clusters C and S are then obliged to explicitly transact a 
knowledge transfer that enables C to exploit soft intangible resources gen-
erated by S.
2.6. Comparative Economic Institutional Analysis 
of telecommunication outcome under integration 
and separation regulatory regimes
Our two-step analysis of telecommunications industrial system allows a 
comparative assessment of its economic performance under alternative 
regulatory regimes. This performance is captured by efficient employment 
of resources to deliver an optimal level of utility for bundle Y. Both opti-
mal performance and efficient employment of resources are determined 
by maximizing the generation of the bundle Y under constraints of costs 
of resources and functional activities. 
As explained above, a better utility of bundle Y corresponds to an higher 
level of one or both elements of the bundle c s
Y Y
,( ) . Consequently, the 
final level of the bundle (quantity/quality) will be driven either by the 
final price of the bundle or the cost of resources. These costs constitute the 
budget constraint for each producer.
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Given the composite nature of bundle Y, this maximization process cap-
tures the trade-off between generation of new (or higher quality) telecom-
munication infrastructures and services (included in the bundle) and cost 
of resources and activities required to make them available to final users. 
By construction, optimal decision-making is concerned with production 
process that incurs decreasing returns to scale for all tangible and hard 
intangible resources. This process further incurs constant returns to scale 
for soft intangible resources and is confronted with ethereal resources 
(featured by constant returns to scale) that have neither reference pric-
ing nor imputation costing. The latter resources provide then a positive 
externality that comes from the past and does not depend on current opti-
mal decision-making. Concerning ethereal resources, for sake of simplic-
ity, their continuative process is limited to one period with b = 1 , that is: 
r r r
t t
* * *= = −1 .
Optimal decision-making depends on the functional system of relation-
ships as shaped by alternative regulatory regimes (Table III). 
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Under the case of integration, optimal decision-making is expressed by the 
following equation: 
 MAX p Y p X p A
X A
Y X IJ A
IJ
IJ;
− −∑  with I T R= ,  and J C S= ,
























































































All parameters a  relate to the direct production process that transforms 
tangible and hard intangible inputs into a tangible output, while param-
eters b  relate to the indirect production process that transforms soft 
intangible inputs in a soft intangible input for Cluster C and only subse-
quently in a tangible output (in equation 12, parameters b  appear twice: 
this means that the production process is enveloped by both Clusters S and 
C, while parameters a  indicate that the production process was started-up 
by Cluster R), or directly in a tangible output (see equation 13). For all opti-
mal solutions, an increase of aggregate payments p
Y
 by final users for the 






) implies a 
higher profitability of use of that input and an increased employment of it. 
Next section shall provide a numerical illustration of these mechanisms.
Functional structure of production of the bundle Y  (analytically captured 
by equations from 1 to 9) decomposes the telecommunication outcome 
through respective contribution by four sets of resources (whose optimal 
amount is described by equations from 10 to 13) as follows:
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* *  [17]









b b b* *  [18]
Therefore, equations 15, 16 and 17 capture an input-output economic anal-
ysis of production process5 (à la Leontief, who was inspired by Sraffa’s semi-
nal work), while equation 18 captures that production share which economic 
imputation of inputs to outputs cannot identify. This special element may 
be understood as the “residual” (à la Solow) of production process of telecom-
munication outcome. The residual captures what cannot be explained by 
attributing to each output the corresponding inputs used to generate them 
according to their specific productive process. This residual at industry level 
corresponds to the Solow’s residual at macroeconomic level; it is generated 
by continuative and collective investments and efforts in innovation and 
R&D (analytically described by functional activity performed by Cluster R).
2.7. Analysis of telecommunication outcome 
under separation regime
Because of functional separation between S and C, optimal decision-mak-
ing is solved through backward induction, starting from optimal decision-
making by Cluster C, and consequently by Cluster S (see Table IV). 
5 Generally speaking, an input-output analysis offers a structural view of industrial 
relationships, expressed in monetary terms, among different sectors of an economy 
throughout a certain period of time. Concerning telecommunications studies, Lee 
and Mokhtarian (2004) apply an input-output analysis to examine relationships 
between transportation and communication input intensities for US across multiple 
points in time. Plaut (1997) provides further references on input-output analyses of 
information and communications technology (ICT).
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This analysis further clarifies mutual relationship between these two 
Clusters. C uses resource s
R
 developed by S and transferred at a transfer 
price pS . This payment results from negotiated (or regulated) arrange-
ment establishing all the specific terms and conditions pertaining to the 
interaction between these now separated Clusters. 
In particular, optimal decision-making by the Cluster C is 
MAX p c p X p X p A p s
X X A
Y Y X RC X X A S R
RC TC
RC TC TC; ;
− ( ) − − −
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Equations (19), (20) and (21) are identical to equations (10), (11) and (13). 
Optimal amount of inputs used by Cluster C does not change. Nevertheless, 
its level of output is lower, because Cluster C cannot exploit any contribution 
of common ethereal resources that were formerly provided by Cluster R.
Optimal decision-making by the Cluster S is: 
MAX p s p s p X p X
X X
Y Y S R X RS X TS
RS TS
RS TS;
+ − ( ) −















































On this basis, functional structure of production of bundle Y  decomposes 
the telecommunication outcome Y through respective contribution of 










First two terms (D1 and D2) are the same as in equations (15) and (16), whilst 
the third element (D3) is given by the following equation:

















** **  [17’]
Next section shall provide a numerical and visual illustration of these 
mechanisms and their analytical results. 
2.8. A numerical and graphical illustration
This section provides an illustration of model setup and its main results. 
In order to develop numerical computation, an explicit Demand Side is 
required to define an equilibrium price.
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Let assume that there is a representative customer. This final user is inter-
ested in the consumption of the overall bundle Y . Costumer’s choice is 
captured by the following standard utility function:
 




with M N and < 0 . 
Inverse demand curve for the bundle is then: 
 p N aY dY = − ( )  [25]
Following our comparative institutional economic analysis, Supply Side is 
defined by two scenarios related to integration and separation regulatory 
regimes. Simplified notation is provided by Table V. 
Table V. A simplified classification of resources
Inputs Input contribute Input cost
Tangibles and 








Soft Intangibles r r
J
= g r( ) ( )∗ = b  with b ≥ 1 Imputed
Ethereal 
Intangibles r rt
* = −1 h r( ) ( )
*∗ = Not computable
2.9. Integration regime
Accordingly, under integration regime, two sub-outputs are produced by 















Moreover, intermediate output produced by Cluster C (equation 6) becomes
 c x c
Y R





, by equations (2 and 9) is
 c r r s x r x rR R RC RS= + + = ( ) +












a a* * *  [28]
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x
Rj
 (with j = C,R) captures here the amount of tangible inputs devoted to R&D.
Aggregating these sub-functions, the bundle Y may be rewritten as
 Y s c x x r x r
Y Y RC RS
= + = ( ) + ( ) +













e a a* *  [29]
Optimal decision-making under integration regime becomes then:
 Max p Y p x x x
x x x
Y X RC RS
RC RS, ,
− + +( )  [30]

































































Where x*  is the sum of optimal level of inputs as identified by equations 
(10) and (11), and x
R
*  is the sum of optimal level of tangible resources 
devoted to R&D as identified by equations (12) and (13).
By substituting these solutions in the bundle function [29], optimal amount 
of supply becomes (equations 14-18):









































+ + +( ) .* *b br r

















































+ +b b( ) .*1 r
Table VI summarises this input-output analysis under integration regime 
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Figure 4 shows Demand and Supply functions for assigned parameters:
Figure 4. Demand and Supply functions with 
a b= = = = = =0 7 1 1 10 400
1
50
. , , , , , .
*
p r N a
x
Table VII shows a numerical input-output analysis for assigned parameters:
Table VII. The input-output scheme under integration
Clusters
Inputs & costs 
( )p
x







































Total Costs -209.32 -209.32
Profits 462.59
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2.10. Separation regime
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Figure 5 shows Demand and Supply functions for assigned parameters:
Figure 5. Demand and Supply functions for increasing values of p(y) with 
a b= = = = = =0 7 1 1 10 400
1
50
. , , , , , .
*
p r N a
x
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Under separation regime, relative bargaining power of Clusters S and C 
(captured by transfer price p) reshapes optimal delivery (by C) and con-
sumption (by S) of tangible inputs devoted to R&D activities. To visualise 
this result, Figures 5 and 6 show two main effects: (i) A direct effect gen-
erated by the absence of ethereal resources, which involves a geometri-
cal translation to the right of supply function by b b( ) *1+ r  (i.e. Bundle’s 
higher price and lower quantity/quality due to missing contribution by 
ethereal resources); (ii) An indirect effect generated by different bargain-
ing power of Clusters, which involves a geometrical change in the shape of 
Supply curve (i.e. higher the bargaining power of Cluster C, lower the level 
of total investment in R&D by both Clusters S and C, and consequently 
lower the quantity/quality of bundle Y). 
Figure 6. Investments in R&D under integration and under separation. 
Under separation the bold line refers to the Cluster C and the dash lines 
refer to various degrees of bargaining power by C  
(i.e. higher power, lower p(s))
Table VIII further illustrates our numerical input-output analysis under 
separation regime for assigned parameters. 
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* 0 0 0 0
Revenue 172.41 389.4
Costs (Cluster S) -42.8 -42.8
Costs (Cluster C) -116.82 -5.52 -122.34
Profits 129.61 267.06
Tables VII and VIII are computed with the same equilibrium price in both 
regimes. Under separation regime, we further assume that Cluster C has a 
bargaining power such that the price pS  is settled to ½ of the price p for 
the whole bundle.6 
By comparing both I/O tables, total profit under integration is greater 
than under separation (462.59 against 129.61 + 267.06 = 396.67). 
Furthermore, by assuming that total profit is equally shared between 
Clusters S and R under the integration regime, it is straightforward that 
Cluster C (S) receives a lower (higher) share under separation regime. 
Accordingly, the Cluster with higher bargaining power is able to extract 
higher profit from negotiation with the other Cluster, even though this 
bargained equilibrium implies at the contractual level a worst situation 
for the entire economy (lower quantity/quality of the joint bundle that 
is delivered to customers). 
6 This assumption is equivalent to assume that p
S
 is higher than the marginal cost of 
inputs employed by Cluster S. This latter cost is assumed equal to one in our numeri-
cal exercise (see Table VIII).
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3. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY
3.1. Implications of our comparative institutional 
economic analysis of alternative regulatory regimes 
of separation and integration
A comparative assessment of both regulatory designs may be derived by 
comparing outcome Y  under regimes of integration and separation. It is 
straightforward that equation (22) is identical to equation (10), although 
output is lower because Cluster S cannot longer exploit the contribution 
of common ethereal resources that were formerly provided by Cluster R. 
In particular, because ethereal resources generated by joint research have 







0  and consequently R = 0 : 
no residual appears. This analytical result is resumed by the following 
lemma:
Lemma Existence of an autonomous R&D Cluster – capable to assure generic and 
specific R&D and innovation, including continued search, development and collec-
tive implementation of innovative results – implies generation of ethereal intangi-
ble resources which contribute to enhance the joint performance (Y) of the telecom-
munications system.
This assumption is strictly linked to the definition of ethereal resources 
and the consequent impossibility to attribute either a market price or 
an imputed cost to them. For sake of simplicity, we assume that these 
resources disappear under separation regime. The same result holds when 
these resources do not disappear (i.e. when their amount is zero), because 
no remuneration can be settled for them in the contractual arrangement 
between C and S, S being unable to settle their remuneration with C. 
Furthermore, critical differences emerge between equation (23) and equa-
tion (12). These differences justify the following proposition:
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Proposition 1: The loss of an autonomous R&D Cluster (lemma 1) under sep-
aration, with its partial replacement by distinct R&D departments of separated 
Clusters, implies a lower optimal performance of the bundle Y due to a deploying 
effect and a bargaining effect.
Corollary 1: Deploying effect is strictly linked to Lemma 1 and the character-
istics of ethereal resources. Our model shows that this effect is greater than zero and 
consequently that functional integration is strictly superior to functional separation.
Deploying effect is captured by equation (18).
Corollary 2: Bargaining effect is generated by the respective bargaining 
power by Clusters. Our economic analysis shows that indirect effect is greater than 
zero.
Bargaining effect is captured by differences between equation (17) and 
equation (17’).
Proof of proposition 1: Existence of ethereal intangible resources (which 
is described by R) implies higher level of production of telecommunica-
tions outcome Y. The deploying effect may be understood as the impossi-
bility to deploy the residual of the overall performance of the system (this 
residual consists of the output share that is not explained after that each 
output component of the joint bundle has been connected to the contri-
bution of involved inputs). Comparison between optimal performances Y 
under alternative regimes shows that production is always greater under 
integration regime. This implies that integrated solution is strictly supe-
rior to separation, providing a First Best Solution.
Previous section has provided a numerical illustration of this proposition. 
Further differences emerge between equation (17) and equation (17’), justi-
fying the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Under separation, a transaction between S and C is required to 
arrange the delivery of intangible output between S and C. If and only if Cluster S 
is enable to appropriate all the extra-performance of the bundle generated by pro-
vision of its intangible output, the telecommunications system may generate a 
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Second Best Solution where p pS Y SR= b  (implying that identity between equa-
tion (17) and equation (17’)).
Proof of proposition 2: By comparing equation (23) and equation (12), 
three possible solutions exist relative to the balance between the transfer 
price p
S
 paid by C and the actual contribution of related input to the over-
all performance of the bundle Y:
• The first solution is p p
S Y SR
> b . This means that the transfer price 
of the (whole of) intangible resource(s) that Cluster C acquires from 
Cluster S is higher than the actual contribution of that resource(s) 
to the overall performance of the bundle. This would imply that C 
should pay for that resource more than the aggregate extra-revenue 
that may be extracted from customers by exploiting the resource 
in its production function. It is straightforward that the demand 
by Cluster C for the input s
R
 will be zero in this case. This scenario 
cannot occur under optimal decision-making by C;
• The second solution is p p
S Y SR
= b . This means that the transfer 
price is equal to the actual contribution of the resource to the over-
all performance of the bundle. This would imply that C pays for that 
resource exactly the aggregate extra-revenue that may be extracted 
from the customers;
• The third solution is p p
S Y SR
< b . This means that the transfer 
price is less than the actual contribution of the resource to the 
overall performance of the bundle. This would imply that C pays 
for that resource less than the aggregate extra-revenue from the 
customers. This has two main consequences: from one hand, C is 
enabled to appropriate a quasi-rent by controlling access to final 
customers; from another hand, the optimal amount of resource 
provided by Cluster S is lower than in the second solution, with 
detrimental effects on the overall performance of the system as a 
whole.
Corollary 4: If the transaction between S and C is achieved under perfect compet-
itive conditions (implying that the transacted payment of output generated by S for 
C tends to its marginal cost, p p
S X
RS
→ ) and p p
X Y SR
RS
< b , then the telecommu-
nications system will generate a Third Best Solution, where p p p
Y SR S X
RS
b > >  
(i.e. the difference between equation (17) and equation (17’) is positive).
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As discussed above, only if p p
S Y SR
= b , the equation (17’) is equal to the 
equation (17). Otherwise, whenever p p
S Y SR
< b , equation (17’) is lower than 
equation (17): optimal performance of the bundle Y is consequently lower.
3.2. Recommendations for regulatory frameworks 
and policies concerned with access, costing 
and pricing
This comparative analysis of both paradigmatic regimes provides some 
recommendations for regulation of access, costing and pricing of the tel-
ecommunication system. Our analysis raises major concerns with forc-
ing separation by regulatory design. The first concern regards absence 
of common and continuative ethereal resources generated by the func-
tional activity of innovation and R&D (Cluster R). This absence leads to 
a second-best solution relatively to first best solution provided by func-
tional integration. Furthermore, although other benefits from separation 
are expected to compensate this net loss of commonalities in innovation 
and R&D, another potential shortcoming arises from mutual relationship 
between S and C under separation regime. If regulatory bodies attempt 
to force S to provide a universal commodity under the same competitive 
terms and conditions for every operators of C, this attempt may engender 
a critical underinvestment in specific resources by S. Competitive pric-
ing imposed by regulation may allow C to pay only for the costs incurred 
by S, while C may then appropriate all extra-revenue generated by the 
joint performance of C and S (rent extraction). This implies an inefficient 
profit-sharing arrangement between C and S. Operators of infrastructure 
intermediation S would then be penalised relative to operators of content 
intermediation C. On the contrary, any efficient solution should allow S 
to share the extra-profit generated by the joint performance of S and C 
on a satisfying basis. In particular, the transfer price should be higher 
than a mere refunding of costs incurred for tangible resources; it should 
include an appropriate quota of the contribution of S to the overall per-
formance of the joint telecommunication outcome.7 These profit-sharing 
schemes may be left to the contractual arrangements between operators 
under appropriate regulatory frameworks. According to Laffont and Tirole 
7 The analysis of appropriate costing and pricing arrangements to settle this quota is 
left to a further exercise.
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(2000, p. xv), “marginal-cost pricing for all services is not viable in tel-
ecom industries (at least in certain important segments involving large 
joint and common costs), so the relevant benchmark requires some mark-
ups. Allowing at least some price discrimination can therefore reduce the 
pricing distortion. Price discrimination may also be the prerequisite for 
the viability of certain investments”. These scholars suggest here allowing 
departures from competitive pricing when large joint and common costs 
are involved. Our approach relates these commonalities to two main fea-
tures of regulated industries: (i) common innovation and R&D processes, 
and (ii) the public interest objectives of universal accessibility to service 
and quality improvements.
These conditional departures from competitive pricing should be further 
submitted to standardised accounting structures that factually identify and 
measure underlying resources and activities for purpose of costing and 
pricing; otherwise, any regulatory determination of this purpose would 
result highly discretionary (Laffont and Tirole, 2000, p. 148). According 
to our framework of analysis, operators and regulators need to properly 
account for both hard intangibles that have market prices of reference, 
and soft (and ethereal) intangibles that factually have not. From this per-
spective, a stock method of accounting for intangibles results to be too 
narrow, because of its focus on hard intangibles alone. A flow method 
of accounting should be preferred; this latter method tracks the cumu-
lated flow of direct and indirect investments in innovation and R&D, 
allowing their conventional imputation within and between operators. 
This cost-based representation of soft intangible resources may be further 
integrated by some appreciation of ethereal intangible resources that are 
fundamental but beyond accounting measurement through imputed cost 
(cf. Biondi and Reberioux, 2012 for further analysis).
CONCLUSION
In the recent decades, new regulatory policies of telecommunications 
industry have been purporting to disband formerly functionally-inte-
grated monopolies owned by the state. The basic idea consists in a sep-
aration by regulatory design between operators of telecommunication 
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infrastructures (infrastructure providers) and providers of information 
services over them (content providers). In fact, these policies need to bal-
ance competitive conditions with promotion of innovation and develop-
ment of telecommunication products, services and infrastructures. Our 
paper has developed an input-output analysis of telecommunication indus-
trial system that connects the producers of contents (who originate infor-
mation and communication) to final consumers (who receive them). 
Accordingly, telecommunications industry is jointly constituted by four 
functional Clusters which exploit four kinds of tangible and intangible 
resources (this framework is generic and may be applied to other infra-
structures-based industries) under distinctive regulatory regimes of func-
tional integration and separation. On this basis, our comparative institu-
tional economic analysis casts doubts on functional regulation by showing 
two inefficient shortcomings: first, the net loss of shared and continu-
ative innovation and R&D; second, the underinvestment in infrastruc-
tures development and innovation whenever the infrastructure provision 
is treated as the arm’s length provision of a universal commodity under 
strictly competitive terms and conditions. In contrast, our analysis rec-
ommends the regulatory allowance of fair profit-sharing arrangements 
between infrastructure providers and content providers over limited peri-
ods of time, coupled with standardised accounting structures for costing 
and pricing that should comprise the whole range of intangible resources 
deployed by telecommunications industry, not only those that have iden-
tifiable market prices of reference. 
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